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Causal Diagrams for Interference
Elizabeth L. Ogburn and Tyler J. VanderWeele
Abstract. The term “interference” has been used to describe any set-
ting in which one subject’s exposure may affect another subject’s out-
come. We use causal diagrams to distinguish among three causal mech-
anisms that give rise to interference. The first causal mechanism by
which interference can operate is a direct causal effect of one individ-
ual’s treatment on another individual’s outcome; we call this direct
interference. Interference by contagion is present when one individ-
ual’s outcome may affect the outcomes of other individuals with whom
he comes into contact. Then giving treatment to the first individual
could have an indirect effect on others through the treated individ-
ual’s outcome. The third pathway by which interference may operate
is allocational interference. Treatment in this case allocates individ-
uals to groups; through interactions within a group, individuals may
affect one another’s outcomes in any number of ways. In many settings,
more than one type of interference will be present simultaneously. The
causal effects of interest differ according to which types of interference
are present, as do the conditions under which causal effects are iden-
tifiable. Using causal diagrams for interference, we describe these dif-
ferences, give criteria for the identification of important causal effects,
and discuss applications to infectious diseases.
Key words and phrases: Causal diagrams, causal inference, contagion,
DAGs, graphical models, infectiousness, interference, nonparametric
identification, social networks, spillover effects.
Traditionally, causal inference has relied on the
assumption of no interference, that is, the assump-
tion that any subject’s outcome depends only on
his own treatment and not on the treatment of
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any other subject. This assumption is often im-
plausible; for example, it is violated when the out-
come is an infectious disease and treating one in-
dividual may have a protective effect on others in
the population. Recent work in statistics has fo-
cused on relaxing the assumption of no interfer-
ence (Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2010; Halloran
and Struchiner, 1995; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008;
Manski, 2013; Rosenbaum, 2007; Tchetgen Tchet-
gen and VanderWeele, 2012; Vansteelandt, 2007).
Much of this work has been motivated by the study
of infectious diseases (Halloran and Struchiner, 1995;
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012; Van-
derWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2011a, 2011b;
Halloran and Hudgens, 2012). Researchers have also
explored the implications of interference on residents
of neighborhoods when some residents are given
housing vouchers to move (Sobel, 2006) or when
new resources are introduced to the neighborhood
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(VanderWeele, 2010). Others have written about the
interference that arises from assigning children to
classrooms and assigning classrooms to educational
interventions (Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2010;
Hong and Raudenbush, 2008; VanderWeele et al.,
2013). The rising prominence of social networks
in public health research underscores the need
for methods that take into account the intercon-
nections among individuals’ treatments and out-
comes (Christakis and Fowler, 2007; Cohen-Cole
and Fletcher, 2008; Mulvaney-Day and Womack,
2009).
Graphical models have shed light on the identifica-
tion of causal effects in many settings (Dahlhaus and
Eichler, 2003; Didelez, Kreiner and Keiding, 2010;
Freedman, 2004; Greenland, Pearl and Robins, 1999;
Pearl, 1995, 1997, 2000; Robins, 2003; Tian and
Pearl, 2002a; Vansteelandt, 2007) but have not yet
been applied to settings with interference. In this
paper, we describe how to draw causal diagrams
representing the complex interdependencies among
individuals in the presence of interference, and how
to use those diagrams to determine what variables
must be measured in order to identify different
causal effects of interest. We review the literature
on causal diagrams and identification of causal ef-
fects in the absence of interference in Section 1, and
recent work on the estimation of causal effects in the
presence of interference in Section 2. In Section 3,
we discuss which covariates must be measured and
controlled for in order to identify causal effects in
the presence of interference. Section 4 introduces the
three distinct types of interference, provides causal
diagrams to help explicate their structure, and de-
scribes some of the causal effects we would wish to
estimate and the assumptions required to identify
them. In Section 5, we use the concepts introduced
in Section 4 to elucidate the nature of interference
in social networks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1. REVIEW OF IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSAL
EFFECTS IN THE ABSENCE OF
INTERFERENCE
Suppose that we wish to estimate the average
causal effect of a treatment A on an outcome Y
from observational data on n individuals for whom
we have also measured a vector of confounders
C. For simplicity, we will assume in this section
and the next that A is binary and Y is continu-
ous, but our remarks apply equally to A and Y
discrete or continuous. Under the assumptions of
no interference and a single version of treatment
(we will not discuss the latter assumption here;
see VanderWeele and Hernan, 2013, for discussion),
Yi(a), a = 0,1 is defined as the counterfactual out-
come we would have observed if, possibly contrary to
fact, subject i had received treatment a. The average
causal effect of A on Y is equal to E[Y (1)]−E[Y (0)],
and it is identified under the three additional as-
sumptions of consistency,
Yi(a) = Yi if Ai = a,(1)
conditional exchangeability,
Yi(a)∐Ai|Ci,(2)
and positivity,
P (Ai = a|Ci = c)> 0
for all a in the support of A and for all c(3)
in the support of C such that P (C = c)> 0.
We refer the reader to Herna´n and Robins (2006)
for discussion of these assumptions.
The conditional exchangeability assumption is
sometimes referred to as the “no unmeasured con-
founding assumption.” Identifying the variables that
must be included in C can be assessed with the aid of
causal diagrams (e.g., Greenland and Robins, 1986;
Greenland, Pearl and Robins, 1999; Pearl, 2003).
Causal diagrams, or causal directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) consist of nodes, representing the variables
in a study, and arrows, representing causal effects.
In a slight abuse of terminology, we will not distin-
guish between nodes on a DAG and the variables
they represent. A DAG is a collection of nodes and
arrows in which no variable is connected to itself by
a sequence of arrows aligned head-to-tail. A causal
DAG is a DAG on which arrows represent causal
effects and that includes all common causes of any
pair of variables on the graph. The causal DAG in
Figure 1 represents the scenario in which the effect
of A on Y is confounded by a single confounder C.
The three arrows encode the causal effects of C on
A, C on Y , and A on Y . We briefly introduce ter-
minology and results for DAGs but refer the reader
to Pearl (2000, 2003) for details and discussion. Re-
cently, Richardson and Robins (2013) introduced a
new class of causal diagrams called single world in-
tervention graphs (SWIGs). This work can be im-
mediately and fruitfully applied to the interference
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Fig. 1.
settings we discuss below; however, in the interest
of space we restrict our attention to DAGs.
A path on a DAG is any unbroken, nonrepeating
sequence of arrows connecting one variable to an-
other. A directed path (or a causal path on a causal
DAG) is a path that follows arrows from tail to head.
A variable X is an ancestor (or cause, if the DAG
is causal) of Z if there is a directed path from X to
Z. Equivalently, Z is a descendent of X . If the di-
rected path from X to Z consists of a single arrow,
then X is a parent of Z and Z is a child of X . On a
causal DAG, we would say that X has a direct effect
on Z. If a path includes X , W and Z and if there
are arrows from both X and Z into W , then W is
a collider on the path. A collider is a path-specific
concept. For example, in Figure 1, Y is a collider on
one path from C to A (the path C → Y ← A) but
not on another (the path C→A→ Y ). A path can
be unblocked, meaning roughly that information can
flow from one end to the other, or blocked, meaning
roughly that the flow of information is interrupted
at some point along the path. If all paths between
two variables are blocked, then the variables are d-
separated, and if two variables are d-separated on a
causal DAG then they are statistically independent.
A path is blocked if there is a collider on the path
such that neither the collider itself nor any of its de-
scendants is conditioned on. An unblocked path can
be blocked by conditioning on any noncollider along
the path. Two variables are d-separated by a set of
variables if conditioning on the variables in the set
suffices to block all paths between them, and if two
variables are d-separated by a third variable or a set
of variables then they are independent conditional
on the third variable or set of variables (Pearl, 1995,
2000).
A backdoor path from X to Z is one that begins
with an arrow pointing into, rather than out of, X .
For example, the path A← C → Y in Figure 1 is
a backdoor path from A to Y . Pearl (1995) proved
that conditioning on a set of nondescendants of A
that block all backdoor paths from A to Y suffices
for exchangeability to hold for the effect of A on Y .
This set need not be unique.
Identification of effects, other than total effects,
often requires assumptions beyond (1), (2), and (3).
Fig. 2.
Path-specific effects quantify the causal effect of one
variable on another via specific causal pathways.
Consider the DAG in Figure 2, which adds a me-
diator M to the path from A to Y . Now there are
two different causal pathways from A to Y , namely
A → Y and A → M → Y . Causal effects of the
form E[Y (a)] − E[Y (a′)] capture all causal path-
ways from A to Y without distinguishing among
them, but we may be interested specifically in di-
rect effects, which bypass the mediator, and indi-
rect effects, which go through the mediator. De-
fine Mi(a) to be the counterfactual value we would
have observed for Mi if Ai had been set to a, and
Yi(a,m) to be the counterfactual value of Yi that
we would have observed if Mi had been set to m
and Ai to a. We make the additional consistency
assumptions that Mi(a) = Mi when Ai = a, that
Yi(a,m) = Yi when Ai = a and Mi = m, and that
Yi(a,Mi(a)) = Yi(a). Then the natural direct effect is
defined as E[Y (a,M(a))]−E[Y (a′,M(a))]; it mea-
sures the expected change in Y due to a change in
A, holding M fixed at M(a). A direct path from X
to Z is said to be deactivated in a particular causal
contrast if X is set to the same value in the coun-
terfactual for Z in both terms of the contrast. A
path is deactivated if any arrow on the path is de-
activated. In the natural direct effect, A is set to
the same value in the counterfactual for M in both
terms of the contrast; therefore the natural direct
effect can be conceptualized as the effect of A on Y
with the path A→M deactivated (Pearl, 2001). The
natural indirect effect, defined as E[Y (a′,M(a))] −
E[Y (a′,M(a′))], measures the expected change in
Y when A is held fixed but M changes from M(a)
to M(a′). This is the effect of A on Y with the
arrow from A to Y deactivated (A is set to a′ in
the counterfactual for Y in both terms of the con-
trast). The natural direct and indirect effects sum
to the total effect of A on Y : E[Y (a)]−E[Y (a′)] =
E[Y (a,M(a))]−E[Y (a′,M(a′)] = {E[Y (a,M(a))]−
E[Y (a′,M(a))]} + {E[Y (a′,M(a))] − E[Y (a′,
M(a′))]}. The controlled direct effect of A on Y ,
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given by E[Y (a,m)]−E[Y (a′,m)] fixes M at a spe-
cific value m and compares the counterfactual out-
comes under two different values of A. This is the
effect of A on Y with the path M → Y deactivated.
In order to identify the controlled direct effect, the
following assumptions are sufficient:
Yi(a,m)∐Ai|Ci(4)
and
Yi(a,m)∐Mi|Ai,Ci.(5)
These correspond respectively to the absence of un-
blocked backdoor paths from Ai to Yi (except pos-
sibly through Mi) conditional on Ci and from Mi
to Yi conditional on Ai and Ci. Avin, Shpitser and
Pearl (2005) proved that in most settings the follow-
ing is a necessary assumption for the identification of
the average natural direct and indirect effects of Ai
on Yi mediated by Mi: there is no variable Wi such
that (i) there is an activated directed path from Ai
to Wi, (ii) there is a deactivated directed path from
Wi to Yi and (iii) there is an activated directed path
from Wi to Yi. A variable that satisfies conditions
(i), (ii) and (iii) is known as a recanting witness,
and we call the assumption of no variable satisfy-
ing these conditions the recanting witness criterion.
In the context of natural direct and indirect effects,
the recanting witness criterion is met if there is no
confounder of the mediator–outcome relation that is
caused by treatment, or (Pearl, 2001)
Yi(a,m)∐Mi(a
′)|Ci.(6)
Assumptions (5), (4), (6) and
Mi(a)∐Ai|Ci,(7)
that is, the absence of unblocked backdoor paths
from Ai to Mi conditional on Ci, suffice to identify
the natural direct and indirect effects.
2. REVIEW OF IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSAL
EFFECTS IN THE PRESENCE OF
INTERFERENCE
Interference is present when one subject’s out-
come may depend on other subjects’ treatments
(Rosenbaum, 2007). It is often reasonable to make
a partial interference assumption that interference
can only occur within subgroups or blocks of sub-
jects. This may be justified if the blocks are sep-
arated by time or space (Hudgens and Halloran,
2008; Sobel, 2006; Tchetgen Tchetgen and Van-
derWeele, 2012; Rosenbaum, 2007). Under interfer-
ence, Yi(a) is not well-defined, since the value of Y
that would have been observed for subject i had
he received treatment a may depend on the treat-
ments received by other subjects. We define counter-
factual notation for interference following Hudgens
and Halloran (2008), Tchetgen Tchetgen and Van-
derWeele (2012), Rubin (1990) and Halloran and
Struchiner (1995). Suppose that n individuals fall
into N blocks, indexed by k, with m = n/N indi-
viduals in each block. If N = 1, so that interference
may occur between any two subjects in the popu-
lation, then we say that there is full interference. If
N = n, then an individual’s treatment can only af-
fect his own outcome and there is no interference.
Let Ak ≡ (Ak1, . . . ,Akm) be the vector of treatment
assignments for individuals in block k and let ak de-
note an m-dimensional vector in the support of Ak.
LetYk ≡ (Yk1, . . . , Ykm) andCk ≡ (Ck1, . . . ,Ckm) be
the vector of outcomes and array of covariates, re-
spectively, for individuals in block k. In what fol-
lows, we reserve boldface letters for vectors or arrays
of length m in which the ith entry corresponds to
the ith individual in block k, and we omit the sub-
script k when taking expectations over blocks. De-
fine Yki(ak) to be the counterfactual outcome that
we would have observed for individual i in block k
under an intervention that set Ak to ak. Following
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012) we re-
place assumption (1) above with a new assumption
of consistency under interference:
Yki(ak) = Yki when Ak = ak.(8)
We also require modified positivity and exchange-
ability assumptions in order to identify causal effects
under interference: we assume that we have mea-
sured a set of pretreatment covariates C for each
individual such that (Tchetgen Tchetgen and Van-
derWeele, 2012)
Yki(ak)∐Ak|Ck(9)
and
P (Ak = ak|Ck = ck)> 0
for all ak in the support of Ak(10)
and for all ck in the support of Ck.
These assumptions suffice to identify the expecta-
tions of counterfactuals of the form Yki(ak) when-
ever ak is an instance of a well-defined intervention
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a and, therefore, to identify causal effects that are
contrasts of such expectations. An intervention will
be well-defined if it uniquely determines which sub-
jects in block receive treatment. Well-defined inter-
ventions are possible, for example, if all blocks are
of the same size, if the individuals in each block are
distinguishable from one another, and if the indi-
viduals are ordered in the same way across blocks.
Suppose interference occurs within blocks comprised
of a father (subject 1), a mother (subject 2) and a
child (subject 3). Then an intervention (1,0,1) in-
dicates that the father and child receive treatment
but the mother does not. If the blocks are of dif-
ferent sizes or if there is no natural way to distin-
guish among the individuals in each block, some
interventions may be well-defined under assump-
tions that the effects of treatment are the same
for different members of the block and do not de-
pend on the size of the block, for example, the in-
tervention that assigns treatment to every individ-
ual in every block. We assume throughout that all
interventions are well-defined. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the blocks are of the same size and that
there is a natural ordering of the subjects in each
block, but most of our comments and results ex-
tend to more general settings. (In the absence of
well-defined interventions, some causal effects can
still be defined, identified and estimated under two-
stage randomization; see Hudgens and Halloran,
2008; Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Halloran, 2012;
VanderWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2011b; Hal-
loran and Hudgens, 2012.)
In Section 3, we use graphical models to deter-
mine which variables must be included in the condi-
tioning set in order for exchangeability to hold. This
gives the identification criteria under interference for
causal effects that are contrasts of expectations of
counterfactuals of the form Yki(ak). Sometimes we
may wish to identify path-specific effects; these re-
quire additional assumptions for identification that
we discuss below.
In this paper, we focus on identification, rather
than estimation, of causal effects. We merely note
here that, for the purposes of estimation and infer-
ence, the effective sample size is N and thus obser-
vation of multiple blocks may be required.
2.1 Causal Effects of A on Y
Although recognition of the fact that interference
may occur in certain settings dates at least as far
back as Ross (1916), it is only recently that progress
has been made on identifying causal effects in the
presence of interference. Halloran and Struchiner
(1995) defined four effects that do not depend on
understanding the mechanisms underlying interfer-
ence and that are identifiable under assumptions (8),
(9) and (10).
The overall effect of intervention a compared to
intervention a′ on subject i is defined as OE i(a,a
′)≡
E[Yi(a)]−E[Yi(a
′)]. We use the index i to indicate
that the expectations do not average over individu-
als within a block but rather over blocks for a par-
ticular individual i. For example, if the blocks are
comprised of a father (subject 1), a mother (sub-
ject 2) and a child (subject 3), then OE 3(a,a
′) =
E[Y3(a)]−E[Y3(a
′)] is the overall effect on a child of
intervention a compared to intervention a′. The av-
erage overall effect OE(a,a′)≡E[Y (a)]−E[Y (a′)],
where E[Y (a)] ≡ 1
m
∑m
i=1E[Yi(a)], averages over
the empirical mean of the counterfactual outcomes
for each block. The unit-level effect of treatment
on subject i fixes the treatment assignments for
all subjects in each block except i, and com-
pares the counterfactual outcomes for subject i
under two different treatment assignments. Let
ak,−i = (ak,1, . . . , ak,i−1, ak,i+1, . . . , ak,m) be a vector
of length m− 1 of treatment values for all subjects
in block k except for subject i. Then UE i(a; a˜, a¯)≡
E[Yi(a−i, a˜)] − E[Yi(a−i, a¯)], where Yki(ak,−i, a˜) is
subject i’s counterfactual outcome under the inter-
vention in which the subjects in block k except for
subject i receive treatments ak,−i and subject i re-
ceives treatment a˜. The spillover effect of interven-
tion a compared to intervention a′ on subject i fixes
i’s treatment level and compares his counterfac-
tual outcomes under the two different interventions.
That is, SE i(a,a
′; a˜)≡E[Yi(a−i, a˜)]−E[Yi(a
′
−i, a˜)].
(The unit-level effect is often referred to as the di-
rect effect and the spillover effect as the indirect
effect of an intervention, but in order to avoid con-
fusion with the direct effect for DAGs defined in
Section 2 and the natural direct and indirect effects
defined in Section 2.2, we will use different termi-
nology. See Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele,
2012, and Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Halloran,
2012, for further discussion of terminology.) We can
also average these effects over individuals within a
block. The average unit-level effect is UE(a; a˜, a¯)≡
E[Y (a−, a˜)]−E[Y (a−, a¯)] and the average spillover
effect is SE (a,a′; a˜) ≡ E[Y (a−, a˜)] − E[Y (a
′
−
, a˜)],
where E[Y (a−, a˜)] ≡
1
m
∑m
i=1E[Yi(a−i, a˜)]. The to-
tal effect compares an individual’s counterfactual
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at one treatment level in a block that receives
one intervention to his counterfactual at a differ-
ent treatment level in a block that receives the an-
other intervention: TE i(a,a
′; a˜, a¯)≡ E[Yi(a−i, a˜)]−
E[Yi(a
′
−i, a¯)]. The average total effect is defined
analogously to the other average effects above. Hud-
gens and Halloran (2008) showed that the total ef-
fect can be decomposed into a sum of unit-level and
spillover effects: TE i(a,a
′; a˜, a¯) = E[Yi(a−i, a˜)] −
E[Yi(a−i, a¯)]+E[Yi(a−i, a¯)]−E[Yi(a
′
−i, a¯)] =DE i(a;
a˜, a¯) + IE i(a,a
′; a¯).
Sobel (2006), Hudgens and Halloran (2008), Van-
derWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen (2011b) and Tch-
etgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012) proposed
ways to estimate and extend unit-level, spillover,
total and overall effects. We will not discuss these
extensions here except to note that they require the
same three identifying assumptions (8), (9) and (10).
2.2 Path Specific Effects of A on Y
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we describe path-specific
effects that may be of interest in certain interfer-
ence contexts; here we review and extend the litera-
ture on path-specific effects under interference. Let
Mk ≡ (Mk1, . . . ,Mkm) be a vector of variables that
may lie on a causal pathway from Ak to Yki. Van-
derWeele (2010) provided identifying assumptions
and expressions for mediated effects with cluster-
level treatments. These effects are applicable to the
context of partial interference where there is inter-
ference by the mediator but not by the treatment
(Mki may have an effect on Ykj for i 6= j, but Ak
is set at the cluster level, and thus is the same for
all individuals in block k). We adapt them here to
accommodate interference by the treatment in ad-
dition to the mediator. We make the consistency as-
sumptions that Mk(ak) =Mk when Ak = ak, that
Ykj(ak,mk) = Ykj whenAk = ak andMk =mk, and
that Ykj(ak,Mk(ak)) = Ykj(ak). The expected con-
trolled direct effect of a block-level treatment Ak
on individual i’s outcome, not through Mk, is de-
fined as E[Yi(a,m)]−E[Yi(a
′,m)]; it measures the
expected change in Yki due to a change in Ak, in-
tervening to set Mk to mk. The expected natural
direct effect is E[Yi(a,M(a))] − E[Yi(a
′,M(a))]; it
measures the expected change in Yki due to a change
in Ak, holding Mk fixed at Mk(ak). The expected
natural indirect effect of Ak on Yki through Mk,
given by E[Yi(a
′,M(a))] − E[Yi(a
′,M(a′))], mea-
sures the expected change in Yki when Ak is fixed
but Mk changes from Mk(ak) to Mk(a
′
k). Average
controlled direct, natural direct, and natural indi-
rect effects are defined similarly to the average ef-
fects in Section 2.1: we average the counterfactu-
als within each block before taking the expectations
over blocks. These natural direct and indirect ef-
fects are identifiable under the following four as-
sumptions:
Yki(ak,mk)∐Ak|Ck,(11)
Yki(ak,mk)∐Mk|Ak,Ck,(12)
Mk(ak)∐Ak|Ck(13)
and
Yki(ak,mk)∐Mk(a
′
k)|Ck.(14)
Assumptions (11), (12) and (13) correspond, respec-
tively, to the absence of unblocked backdoor paths
from Ak to Yki (except possibly through Mk) condi-
tional on Ck, from Mk to Yki conditional on Ak and
Ck, and fromAk toMk conditional onCk. Assump-
tion (14), similar to (6), corresponds to the recanting
witness criterion. Under these assumptions, counter-
factual expectations of the form E[Yi(a
′,M(a))] are
identified and, therefore, so are the natural direct
and indirect effects, which are contrasts of such ex-
pectations. Specifically, E[Yi(a
′,M(a))] is identified
by
∑
c
∑
m
E[Yi|A= a
′,M=m,C= c]
· P (M=m|A= a,C= c)P (C= c).
Assumptions (11) and (12) suffice to identify the
controlled direct effect.
3. COVARIATE CONTROL
Although the subscripts are usually suppressed,
under the assumption of no interference the stan-
dard DAG for the effect of a treatment A on an out-
come Y with confounders C is drawn to show the re-
lationships among Yi, Ai and Ci for subject i. Under
interference, however, it is not sufficient to consider
causal pathways at the individual level; a causal
DAG must depict an entire block. For simplicity,
we will focus on blocks of the smallest size that pre-
serves the essential structure of interference, which
for our purposes will be two or three. The principles
extend to groups of any size, but the DAGs become
considerably more complex as the blocks grow. The
DAG for the effect of A on Y in a group of size two
with no interference is depicted in Figure 3. In what
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Fig. 3.
follows, we represent a single block of subjects on
each DAG, and we therefore suppress the subscript
k indicating membership in block k.
Interference can be represented by a DAG like the
one given in Figure 4. The arrows from Ai to Yj
for i 6= j represent the effect that one individual’s
treatment has on another’s outcome. This represen-
tation suffices whenever contrasts of counterfactu-
als of the form Y (a), such as the effects described in
Fig. 4.
Section 2.1, are the only effects of interest. However,
as we will see below, when contagion or allocational
interference are present, such a diagram does not
represent information about how the effect of Ai on
Yj operates. In Section 4, we describe how to rep-
resent this additional information on a DAG. We
describe covariate control in the general cases de-
picted in the DAGs in Figures 4 and 5 before mov-
ing on in Section 4 to tease apart the structures that
make direct interference, interference by contagion,
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g)
Fig. 5.
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and allocational interference distinct. The principles
of covariate control in the presence of interference
are straightforward: like in the case of no interfer-
ence, they follow from the fact that all backdoor
paths from treatment to outcome must be blocked
by a measured set of covariates. However, without
taking the time to draw the operative causal DAG
with interference it is easy to make mistakes, like
controlling only for individual-level covariates when
block-level covariates are necessary to identify the
causal effect of interest. Below we will consider a
number of different settings and causal structures,
and discuss in each whether control for only an indi-
vidual’s covariates suffices to identify causal effects
or whether control for the covariates of the entire
block (or of some summary) is needed.
If the individuals in the block share no common
causes of A or Y , as in the DAG in Figure 4, then
Ci suffices to block the backdoor paths from Ai to
Yi and from Aj to Yi and, therefore, exchangeabil-
ity for the effect of A on Yi holds conditional on
Ci. That is, Yi(ai, aj) ∐ A|Ci for all i. If Cj is a
direct cause of Yi for i 6= j, as in Figure 5(a), then
exchangeability for the effect of A on Yi necessitates
block- and not just individual-level covariates. Even
if each individual’s treatment is randomized condi-
tional on his own covariates (this corresponds to the
absence of arrows Cj to Ai for i 6= j on the DAG),
there is still a backdoor path from Aj to Yi via Cj
and, somewhat counterintuitively, it is necessary to
control for Cj in addition to Ci in any model for the
effect of A on Yi. On the other hand, if Cj directly
affects Ai but not Yi for i 6= j, as in Figure 5(b),
then for exchangeability for the effect of A on Yi it
suffices to condition only on Ci. If, in addition to
Ci, a function h(C) of the vector of covariates influ-
ences outcome (Figure 5(c); for example, the mean
value of C for the block), then Ci and either h(C)
or Cj need to be conditioned on in order to achieve
exchangeability for the effect of A on Yi. If h(C)
only influences treatment assignment (Figure 5(d)),
then only Ci must be conditioned on. If a block-
level characteristic D is a common cause of A and
Y (Figure 5(e)), then Ci and D must be conditioned
on in order to achieve exchangeability for the effect
of A on Yi. If Ci and Cj share a common cause (Fig-
ure 5(f)), then exchangeability for the effect of A on
Yi holds conditional on Ci.
Even in the absence of interference for the effect of
A onY, there are scenarios in which individual-level
covariates do not suffice to control for the effect of an
individual’s treatment on his own outcome. For ex-
ample, the DAG in Figure 5(g) depicts a scenario in
which one individual’s covariates affect another indi-
vidual’s treatment and outcome (represented by the
arrows Ci→Aj and Ci→ Yj), but there is no effect
of one individual’s treatment on another’s outcome
(no directed path from Ai to Yj). In other words,
there is interference for the effect of C on Y but
not for the effect of A on Y. Vansteelandt (2007)
noted that in this setting it is necessary to condition
on C to achieve exchangeability for the effect of Ai
on Yi.
Consider the DAG in Figure 4, but now suppose
that C is unobserved. As we discussed above, Ci is
a confounder of the effect of Ai on Yi, but in this
DAG the effect of Aj on Yi is unconfounded (there
is no backdoor path from Aj to Yi). If a researcher
hypothesizes that the DAG in Figure 4 represents
the underlying causal structure in a particular set-
ting but he does not have access to data on the con-
founders C, then the effect of A on Yi is not iden-
tified. However, the unconfounded effect of Aj on
Yi is identified by E[Yi|Aj = aj ]. This quantity has
an interpretation in the interference setting as the
weighted average of expected counterfactuals within
strata of C.
E[Yi|Aj = aj]
=
∑
ai
∑
c
E[Yi|Ai = ai,Aj = aj ,Ci = c]
· P (Ai = ai|Ci = c)P (Ci = c)
=
∑
ai
∑
c
E[Yi(ai, aj)|Ai = ai,Aj = aj,Ci = c]
· P (Ai = ai|Ci = c)P (Ci = c)
=
∑
ai
∑
c
E[Yi(ai, aj)|Ci = c]
· P (Ai = ai|Ci = c)P (Ci = c),
where the first equality relies on the facts that
Ai∐Aj |Ci and Ci∐Aj , the second relies on consis-
tency, and the third on conditional exchangeability.
Alternatively, this quantity has the interpretation of
E[Yi(aj)] in an experiment where Yi is considered to
be the only outcome, Aj is the treatment of interest
and is intervened on, and Ai is randomly assigned
according to the actual distribution P (Ai|Ci) in the
population.
The hypothetical experiment described above
points toward a possible strategy for estimating the
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effect of one component of A on Yi when the con-
founders of the effect of A on Yi are not fully ob-
served. The researcher can analyze each block of
subjects as a single observation, with a single treat-
ment and outcome. This strategy discards data on
others’ treatments and outcomes but may allow for
progress even if the full set of covariates needed to
identify Yi(a) are not observed.
In some of the DAGs in Figure 5, identification of
the effect of Aj on Yi requires fewer covariates than
the effect of A on Yi. In Figure 5(c), Cj suffices to
control for confounding of the effect of Aj on Yi even
though it does not suffice for the effect of A on Yi.
For the DAG in Figure 5(e), D suffices to control
for confounding of the effect of Aj on Yi.
In some cases, we can identify the effect of Ai on
Yi with fewer covariates than are required to iden-
tify the effect of A on Yi. In Figures 5(a) and 5(c),
we can identify the effect of Ai on Yi if only Ci is ob-
served, even though we cannot identify the effect of
A on Yi without also observing Cj (or h(C)). In the
Appendix, we give the identifying expressions for
these effects.
For the DAGs in Figures 5(b)–5(f), the entire vec-
tor C is not necessary to identify the effect of A on
Yi, though it would in general be necessary in order
to jointly identify the effects of A on Yi and on Yj
(i.e., the effect of A on Y). This is because in order
to identify the effect of A on Y we require con-
ditional exchangeability to hold for all subjects. In
these settings, if C is not fully observed but certain
components or functions of C required to identify
the effect of A on Yi are, then we can proceed by
considering Yi to be the only outcome in each block.
We can still consider the full vector of treatments A,
and therefore identify unit-level, spillover, total and
overall effects of A on Yi.
4. THREE DISTINCT TYPES OF
INTERFERENCE
By understanding the causal mechanisms underly-
ing interference, we can more precisely target effects
of interest. There are three distinct causal pathways
by which one individual’s treatment may affect an-
other’s outcome. All fall under the rubric of inter-
ference. The distinction among them has generally
not been made, but they differ in causal structure,
effects of interest and requirements for identification
of effects. Often more than one type of interference
will be present simultaneously.
The first pathway by which interference may oper-
ate is a direct causal effect of one individual’s treat-
ment on another individual’s outcome, unmediated
with respect to the first individual’s outcome. We
call this direct interference. As an example, suppose
that the outcome is obesity and the treatment is di-
etary counseling from a nutritionist. An individual
who receives treatment can in turn “treat” his asso-
ciates by imparting to them the information gained
from the nutritionist; therefore, if individual i re-
ceives treatment and individual j does not, individ-
ual j may be nevertheless be exposed to the treat-
ment of individual i and his or her outcome will be
affected accordingly.
A second pathway by which one individual’s treat-
ment may affect another individual’s outcome is via
the first individual’s outcome. For example, if the
outcome is an infectious disease and the treatment
is a prophylactic measure designed to prevent dis-
ease, then the treatment of individual i may affect
the outcome of individual j by preventing individ-
ual i from contracting the disease and thereby from
passing it on. We call this type of interference inter-
ference by contagion. It is differentiated from direct
interference by the fact that it does not represent
a direct causal pathway from the exposed individ-
ual to another individual’s outcome, but rather a
pathway mediated by the outcome of the exposed
individual.
The third pathway for interference is allocational
interference. Treatment in this setting allocates in-
dividuals to groups; through interactions within a
group individuals’ characteristics may affect one an-
other. An example that often arises in the social
science literature is the allocation of children to
schools or of children to classrooms within schools
(Angrist and Lang, 2004; Graham, Imbens and Rid-
der, 2010; Hong and Raudenbush, 2008). The per-
formance and behavior of student i may affect the
performance and behavior of student j in the same
class, for example, by distracting or motivating stu-
dent j or by occupying the teacher’s attention. An-
other example that can be seen as allocational in-
terference is the effect of college enrollment on wage
differences for college- versus high-school-educated
workers, where the wage difference depends on the
proportion of workers in each education category
(Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).
4.1 Direct Interference
Direct interference is present when there is a
causal pathway from one individual’s treatment to
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another individual’s outcome, not mediated by the
first individual’s outcome. Interference can be direct
with respect to a particular outcome but not an-
other. Consider two individuals living in the same
household, each randomized to an intervention de-
signed to prevent high cholesterol. Suppose the in-
tervention consists of cooking classes, nutritional
counseling and coupons that can be redeemed for
fresh produce, and consider a household in which
one individual is treated and one untreated. The
treated individual could bring fresh produce into
the household, prepare healthy meals, and talk
about the nutritionist’s counsel, thereby exposing
the other individual to a healthier diet. If the out-
come of interest is a measure of blood cholesterol
level, then this is an example direct interference:
the untreated individual is exposed to the treated
individual’s diet and that exposure reduces the un-
treated individual’s cholesterol. On the other hand,
if the outcome is a measure of healthy diet and
behavior, then the same story depicts contagion
rather than direct interference: the treated individ-
ual adopts a healthier diet which results in the un-
treated individual also adopting a healthier diet.
Diet may spread by contagion; cholesterol presum-
ably would not.
In many settings, direct interference and conta-
gion will be present simultaneously for the same out-
come. For example, suppose that in the story above
the outcome were weight change. Then it is possible
that the treated individual’s family member could
lose weight both because of exposure to healthier
foods (direct interference) and because he was mo-
tivated by the weight loss of his relative (contagion).
Direct interference has the simplest causal struc-
ture of the three types of interference. In addition
to a direct causal path from Ai to Yi, there is also a
direct path from Ai to Yj for all pairs (i, j) such that
subjects i and j are in the same block. Direct inter-
ference in a block of size two is depicted in the DAGs
in Figures 4 and 5, with the exception of Figure 5(g).
Because there is only a single path from Ai to Yj for
any pair i, j, differences between counterfactuals of
the form Yi(a) capture all of the causal effects of A
on Yi and, therefore, effects like the total, unit-level,
spillover and overall effects described in Section 2.1
summarize the causal effects of A on Yi.
4.2 Interference by Contagion
Interference by contagion often has a complex
causal structure, because it can involve feedback
Fig. 6.
among different individuals’ outcomes over time.
The causal structure of the effect of Ai on Yi is
straightforward: Ai has a direct protective effect on
Yi, represented by a direct arrow from Ai to Yi on
the DAG. The effect of Ai on Yj is considerably
more complex. It is tempting to represent the effect
of Ai on Yj as a mediated effect through Yi, but
this cannot be correct, as Yi and Yj are contempo-
raneous and, therefore, one cannot cause the other.
The effect of Ai on Yj is mediated through the evo-
lution of the outcome of individual i; this compli-
cated structure is depicted in the DAG in Figure 6,
where Y ti represents the outcome of individual i at
time t, T is the time of the end of follow-up, and
the dashed arrows represent times 4 through T − 1,
which do not fit on the DAG (but which we assume
were observed). The unit of time required to capture
the causal structure depends on the nature of trans-
mission of the outcome; it should be the case that
the probability of one individual’s outcome affecting
another’s is unaltered by differences in timing on a
scale smaller than the units used.
In order to further explicate the structure, we
consider the case of an infectious disease like the
flu. Infectious diseases are paradigmatic examples of
contagion. Halloran and Struchiner (1995), Hudgens
and Halloran (2008) and VanderWeele and Tchetgen
Tchetgen (2011a) have written about identification
and estimation of overall, unit-level, spillover and
total effects for vaccinations against infectious dis-
eases, and we follow up with this literature in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. Although we illustrate the principles of
interference by contagion through the lens of infec-
tious diseases, this type of interference can occur
in many and diverse settings: an educational inter-
vention assigned to one student could affect that
student’s performance, which in turn might affect
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the performance of her classmates; a get-out-the-
vote mailing could motivate its recipients to decide
to vote, and communicating that decision to friends
could change the friends’ voting behavior. The prin-
ciples that we discuss below apply to any of these
settings.
Suppose that the flu vaccine has a protective ef-
fect against the flu by preventing or shortening the
duration of episodes of the flu for some individuals.
Let A be an indicator of getting the flu vaccine be-
fore the start of a six-month long flu season, and let
Y be the total number of days spent infectious with
the flu over the course of the season. In the DAG
in Figure 6, Y ti represents the flu status of individ-
ual i at time t (measured in days), T ≡ 180 is the
day of the end of flu season, and the dashed arrows
represent days 4 through T − 1, which do not fit on
the DAG (but which we assume were observed). Let
Y ti be the total number of days spent infectious up
to and including day t. (Note that, when Y ti is ob-
served for all t, this is equivalent to coding it as an
indicator of individual i being infectious at time t.)
In choosing days as the unit of time, we are making
the assumption that the probability of one individ-
ual infecting another is not affected by a difference
of a fraction of a day in flu duration.
We will rarely have fine-grained information on
the evolution of the outcome over time. In the rest of
this section, we describe how to draw the appropri-
ate causal DAGs and how to identify causal effects in
such cases. Drawing a causal DAG using only a sub-
set of relevant variables has been extensively studied
in the graphical models literature and involves an
operation known as projection (Pearl and Verma,
1994; Tian and Pearl, 2002b; Verma, 1993). Projec-
tion algorithms are somewhat technical; below we
provide an intuitive discussion of the construction
of causal DAGs when not all variables relevant to
contagion are observed.
If we only observe the outcome (cumulative days
of the flu) at the end of the season, then, as in the
DAG in Figure 7, we replace the collection of all un-
observed variables (i.e., Y ti for t < T ) with U . With-
out additional assumptions, we cannot replace the
Fig. 7.
Fig. 8.
two diagonal pathways through U with direct ar-
rows from A1 to Y
T
2 and from A2 to Y
T
1 ; that would
imply that Y T1 ∐ Y
T
2 |A1,A2, which is shown to be
false by the DAG in Figure 6. If we know who gets
the flu first, then the DAG in Figure 8 represents
the causal relations among the observed variables,
where T0 is the time of the first case of the flu.
The unmeasured variable U cannot be omitted be-
cause Y T1 is not independent of Y
T
2 conditional on
{Y T0
1
, Y T0
2
}; Y T1 depends on the number and timing
of individual 2’s illnesses between time T0 and time
T . It might seem as though Y T0
1
should be indepen-
dent of Y T0
2
conditional on {A1,A2} in this scenario,
because there can be no contagion before the first
case of the flu. But this is not the case: Y T0i can be
thought of as an indicator that individual i gets the
flu before or at the same time as individual j, and
this is dependent on individual j remaining healthy
through time T0− 1. On the other hand, condition-
ing on the time of the first case of the flu renders
Y T0
1
and Y T0
2
independent, because conditioning on
T0 is tantamount to conditioning on both individu-
als remaining healthy until the time of the first case,
that is, on their entire flu histories up to time T0.
Suppose information on the number but not du-
ration of cases of the flu is available. Then we could
define Y t to be the number of distinct cases initiated
by time t. However, this outcome fails to capture
all of the relevant information about an individual’s
flu status, because a case of the flu that lasts ten
days may be more contagious than one that lasts
five days. Therefore, there may be an effect of Ai on
Y tj that is not mediated by Y
s
j , s < t, being instead
mediated by the duration of individual i’s flu inci-
dents. This is represented on the DAG in Figure 9
by an arrow from Ai to Y
t
j . These arrows encode the
fact that Y tj is dependent on Y
t
i even conditional on
{Y si , Y
s
j } for all s < t. Similarly, if the outcome on
the DAG in Figure 8 were the total number of flu
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Fig. 9.
episodes by the end of the season instead of the cu-
mulative days of flu we would add arrows from Ai
to Y T0j and to Y
T
j .
If there are common causes C of treatment and
outcome for each individual, as in the DAG in Fig-
ure 10, then exchangeability for the effect of A on
Y Ti will hold conditional on Ci. If there are com-
mon causes of treatments for different individuals,
or of treatments and outcomes across individuals,
then exchangeability requires conditioning on them.
The same conclusions about exchangeability hold if
we observe the outcome only at select time points.
The overall, unit-level, spillover and total effects
defined in Section 2.1 do not distinguish among the
multiple distinct causal pathways from Ai to Y
T
j .
We discuss estimation of path-specific effects below.
Fig. 10.
4.2.1 Contagion and infectiousness Recently, Van-
derweele, Tchetgen and Halloran (2012) described
the decomposition of the spillover effect, that is the
effect of Ai on Yj , into a “contagion effect” and
an “infectiousness effect.” The contagion effect is
the protective effect that vaccinating one individ-
ual has on another’s disease status by preventing
the vaccinated individual from getting the disease
and thereby from transmitting it, similar to the ef-
fect we discussed above. In order to illustrate the
infectiousness effect, consider the following refine-
ment to our example. Suppose that a vaccine ex-
ists for the flu that prevents the disease for some
individuals and also makes some cases of the dis-
ease among vaccinated individuals less likely to be
transmitted. Let A be an indicator of vaccination
before the start of flu season and let Y t be the to-
tal number of episodes of flu up to and including
day t. Then Ai may have an effect on Y
t
j even if
it has no effect on Y ti , that is, even if individual
i would get the flu whether vaccinated or not, by
preventing individual i from transmitting the flu to
individual j. This infectiousness effect represents a
pathway that is distinct from the contagion effect
because it does not operate through the infection
status of the vaccinated individual. The infectious-
ness effect has the structure of a direct effect by
which individual i’s vaccination confers improved
protection against individual i’s flu on individual
j; it represents a type of direct interference. This
is similar to the example above in which the dura-
tion of flu episodes was unobserved: infectiousness,
like flu duration, is a property of the infected indi-
vidual’s disease state, but if it is not captured by
the outcome measure then it has the structure of a
direct effect of Ai on Yj . The contagion and infec-
tiousness effects are not identifiable without strong
assumptions or carefully conceived data collection.
When they are identifiable their sum (or product if
they are defined on the multiplicative scale) is equal
to the total spillover effect of Ai on Yj .
Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Halloran (2012) de-
fined the contagion and infectiousness effects as the
natural indirect and direct effects, respectively, of
A1 on Y
T
2 with Y
T0
1
as the mediator, where T0 is
the day of the first flu infection and T is the day of
the end of follow-up, for example, the last day of the
flu season. That is, the contagion effect is defined
as E[Y T2 (0, Y
T0
1
(1))] − E[Y T2 (0, Y
T0
1
(0))] and infec-
tiousness by E[Y T2 (1, Y
T0
1
(1))] − E[Y T2 (0, Y
T0
1
(1))].
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Fig. 11. This DAG corresponds to a household of size two in
which individual 2 is always unvaccinated and disease status
is assessed at the end of follow-up. U represents unmeasured
variables.
For simplicity and consistency with the existing lit-
erature we adopt the setting used in VanderWeele
and Tchetgen Tchetgen (2011a), Vanderweele, Tch-
etgen and Halloran (2012) and Halloran and Hud-
gens (2012): each block is a group of size two who
share a household, and in each pair individual 1 is
randomized to vaccine while individual 2 is always
unvaccinated. If, as those authors assumed, disease
status is observed only at the end of follow-up, Fig-
ure 11 depicts the operative DAG. Although there is
an unmeasured variable on the path from A1 to Y
T
2 ,
it is not a confounder and we can identify the effect
of A1 on Y
T
2 . However, we cannot identify the com-
ponent contagion and infectiousness effects without
observing the mediator Y T0
1
. In order to circumvent
the problem of the unobserved mediator, Vander-
weele, Tchetgen and Halloran (2012) assumed that
each individual can be infected only once and that
individual 2 can only be infected by individual 1,
as would be the case if individual 2 were home-
bound. These assumptions dramatically simplify the
causal structure by ensuring that individual 1 is in-
fected first and that there is no feedback between
the time of first infection and the end of follow up.
Then Y T1 must be equal to Y
T0
1
, and thus Y T0
1
is ob-
served. These assumptions are encoded by the DAG
in Figure 12. Now the contagion and infectiousness
effects can be identified as the natural indirect and
direct effects of A1 on Y
T
2 mediated by Y
T
1 = Y
T0
1
, as
long as assumptions (4) through (7) are met. Three
of these assumptions correspond to the absence of
any unmeasured confounding of the relationships
Fig. 12. This DAG corresponds to the same setting as Fig-
ure 11, but under the assumptions that individual 2 can only
be infected by individual 1 and that only one event is possible
per subject during follow-up.
between A1 and Y
T
1 , between Y
T
1 and Y
T
2 condi-
tional on A1, and between A1 and Y
T
2 , respectively.
These assumptions can be made conditional on mea-
sured covariates C. Assumption (6) is the recanting
witness criterion.
The simplifying assumption that the outcome can
occur at most once may be reasonable for many in-
fectious diseases. More limiting is the assumption
that individual 2 can only be infected by individual
1. Here, we will describe settings in which it may be
possible to relax this assumption. Even if we observe
the time and identity of the first case of the flu in ad-
dition to the outcome at the end of follow-up, relax-
ing this assumption makes identification of the con-
tagion and infectiousness effects impossible. In the
DAG in Figure 13, Y T0
1
is an indicator of whether
individual 1 was infected first. Although it is not
straightforward to imagine intervening on T0, the
time of the first infection, we include this variable
in the DAG in order to ensure that the DAG encodes
the true conditional independence statements. The
presence of the arrow from T0 to Y
T
2 makes T0 a re-
canting witness for the contagion and infectiousness
effects: it is a confounder of the mediator–outcome
relation that is caused by treatment. This arrow is
necessitated by the fact that T0 predicts Y
T
2 even
conditional on A1 and Y
T0
1
. To see this, imagine two
different pairs in which individual 1 is vaccinated
and gets sick first (A1 = Y
T0
1
= 1). Suppose that in
one pair, the vaccinated individual gets sick at the
very end of the follow-up period (T0 = T − 1). Then
the probability that the second individual gets the
flu after time T0 but before time T is very small.
Suppose that in the other pair the vaccinated in-
dividual gets sick on the first day of the flu season
(T0 = 1). The probability that we observe the sec-
ond individual in this pair to get sick before the end
of follow-up is much higher.
Fig. 13. This DAG corresponds to the same setting as Fig-
ure 12, but without the assumption that individual 2 can only
be infected by individual 1. The dashed arrow is present when
T is defined as the end of the flu season; it is absent when T
is defined as T0 + s.
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One possible solution to the recanting witness
problem is to let T0 determine a new artificial end
of follow-up, so that the amount of time between
T0 and T is constant over different values of T0. In
particular, if we know that an infected individual
is infectious for up to s days after becoming symp-
tomatic, then we can let T = T0+ s and collect data
on Y T0
1
, Y T0+s
1
and Y T0+s
2
. If neither individual in
the pair is observed to get the flu then T0 = T = the
last day of the flu season. Setting the artificial end of
follow-up to lag behind the time of first infection by
s days ensures that we will observe Y T0
1
= Y T0+s
2
= 1
for any pair in which individual 2 catches the flu
from individual 1. We throw away data on pairs for
which the first infection occurs fewer than s days be-
fore the end of the flu season, but if s is small then
it may be reasonable to assume that any resulting
bias is negligible.
One further assumption is required in order for
Y T0+s
2
∐ T0|Y
T0
1
,A1, which is the conditional inde-
pendence assumption that licenses the omission of
an arrow from T0 to Y
T0+s
2
. Suppose that cumu-
lative exposure to the flu virus makes people, on
average, less susceptible to infection as the flu sea-
son progresses due to acquired immunity. Then, for
pairs in which individual 1 is vaccinated and gets
sick first, individual 2 is less likely to catch individ-
ual 1’s flu later in the season as compared to ear-
lier (for larger values T0 compared to smaller val-
ues). This violates Y T0+s
2
∐T0|Y
T0
1
,A1. If we assume
that the probability of individual 2 catching the flu
if exposed on day t is constant in t, then Y T0+s
2
is independent of T0 conditional on A1 and Y
T0
1
.
Therefore, T0 is not a recanting witness (it is still
caused by treatment but is no longer a confounder
of the mediator–outcome relation). Assuming that
exchangeability assumptions (4), (5) and (7) hold
(see Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Halloran, 2012 for
discussion of their plausibility in this context), the
contagion and infectiousness effects of A1 on Y
T0+s
2
are identifiable. The contagion effect is given by
E[Y T0+s
2
(0, Y T0
1
(1))] − E[Y T0+s
2
(0, Y T0
1
(0))] and in-
fectiousness by E[Y T0+s
2
(1, Y T0
1
(1))] − E[Y T0+s
2
(0,
Y T0
1
(1))]. The spillover effect of A1 on Y
T0+s
2
on the
additive scale is the sum of the contagion and infec-
tiousness effects.
If both individuals are randomized to vaccina-
tion, then A2 is a confounder of the relationship
between Y T0
1
and Y T0+s
2
. Assuming A2 is observed,
this does not pose a problem for identification of
the contagion and infectiousness effects. General-
izations of the contagion and infectiousness effects
to blocks of size greater than two are also possible
(Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Halloran, 2012).
An alternative definition of an infectiousness ef-
fect, proposed by Vanderweele, Tchetgen and Hal-
loran (2012), is the controlled direct effect of A1 on
Y T2 , holding Y
T0
1
fixed at 1. Identification of this ef-
fect does not require the recanting witness criterion
to hold and, therefore, it is identifiable when the
end-of-follow up is fixed and does not depend on T0.
A disadvantage of this controlled direct infectious-
ness effect is that it does not admit a decomposition
of the indirect effect of A1 on Y
T
2 . That is, if we sub-
tract the controlled direct infectiousness effect from
the total effect of A1 on Y
T
2 , the remainder cannot
be interpreted as a contagion effect.
4.3 Allocational Interference
In allocational interference, an individual is al-
located to a group and his outcome is affected by
which individuals are allocated to the same group.
In many real settings, group allocation is not ran-
dom, rather individuals select their own group or
are assigned based on previously observed char-
acteristics. One example of random group alloca-
tion is the assignment of college freshman to dorms
or dorm rooms (Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2009;
Sacerdote, 2000). We differentiate between alloca-
tional interference and other scenarios in which in-
dividuals already in groups are assigned to receive
individual or group-level treatments. In the former
setting, an individual’s outcome depends on the spe-
cific composition of his group, while in the latter
it depends on treatment assignments for his group
but not necessarily on group composition. Of course,
these two phenomena often occur in tandem, as they
would if children were assigned to classrooms which
were then assigned different educational interven-
tions.
Similarly, contagion is often present in conjunc-
tion with allocational interference. For example, in
the allocation of children to classrooms there is likely
to be feedback among children who are in the same
classroom in terms of achievement, attitude and ten-
dency to act out. Therefore, any measure of behav-
ior or achievement that can evolve over time would
likely be subject to contagion. An outcome like end-
of-the-year test scores, on the other hand, would
evince allocational interference without contagion as
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one student’s test score cannot directly affect an-
other’s (though we would likely still envision conta-
gion with respect to knowledge or learning).
Allocational interference is perhaps the most com-
plicated of the three types of interference. We first
describe how to represent basic allocational interfer-
ence on a DAG. Then we introduce a toy example
and use it to illustrate some additional DAG struc-
tures and to briefly discuss causal effects that may
be of interest in the presence of allocational inter-
ference. This discussion is far from exhaustive, but
we hope that this section will serve as a guide for
how to think about allocational interference.
Allocational interference assigns subjects to groups
within each block. Recall that blocks of individuals
are independent from one another, and that interfer-
ence is possible within but not between blocks. This
is not the case for groups; interference will generally
be present across groups within the same block. In
the school example, blocks might be different schools
and groups might be classrooms within each school.
Suppose that within each block there are L possi-
ble groups to which an individual can be allocated.
Then treatment is a categorical variable, A, which
for each subject takes on the value l ∈ (1, . . . ,L) of
the group to which that individual was assigned. As
in Section 2, we let k index N blocks with m indi-
viduals in each block. Let Ak be the vector of group
assignments in block k.
Figure 14 provides a DAG for a scenario with allo-
cational interference and m= 3. Within each block,
we allocate the subjects into two distinct groups and
each individual’s outcome may be affected by who
is in each group. The DAG depicts a single block
and we therefore suppress the subscript k. Let Yi be
Fig. 14.
the outcome for individual i and Zi be a vector of
all baseline characteristics that affect the outcome of
individual i or the outcomes of the other individuals
with whom he comes into contact. Define Z∗i to be
an (m−1)-dimensional array with jth element equal
to Zj × I(Aj = Ai), j 6= i, that is, the baseline co-
variates of subject j multiplied by the indicator that
individual j is assigned to the same group as indi-
vidual i. In addition to the individual level causal
arrows from Zi and Z
∗
i into Yi, we require arrows
from Zi to Z
∗
j and from Ai to Z
∗
j for all pairs (i, j),
i 6= j. This is because Z∗j is by definition a function
of A and of Zi for all i 6= j. Randomized allocation
corresponds to the absence of the dashed arrows into
A. Otherwise, an individual’s baseline covariates Zi
may affect his group assignment Ai. For Zi to affect
Ai and not Aj would entail an allocation rule that
ignores balance across groups. In some settings, the
vector of baseline covariates Z (or a function of Z,
e.g., its mean) would affect the allocation rule. This
is represented by the presence of the dashed arrows
into A.
We now describe a toy example in which alloca-
tional interference operates and informs causal ef-
fects of interest. Suppose that runners enter a 5000
meter race, but the track is not wide enough for all of
the competitors to race simultaneously. A race rep-
resents a single interference block; in order to per-
form statistical inference on the effects discussed be-
low we would likely need to observe several indepen-
dent races, indexed by k. The runners in each race
are divided into smaller groups to race in successive
heats. Number the subjects according to some com-
posite measure of their recent performance, so that
runner 1 is the fastest based on the composite mea-
sure and runnerm is the slowest. Let Yki be the time
in which runner i in block k finishes the race and Zki
be a vector of all relevant baseline characteristics. A
runner’s speed will affect his own outcome. More-
over, his speed, confidence and sportsmanship may
have an impact on the outcomes of the runners with
whom he is grouped. These characteristics should
all be included in Zki. The runners are divided into
three heats, so Aki ∈ {1,2,3}. For simplicity, we as-
sume that m is divisible by 3 and each heat has m/3
runners, though heats of different sizes are possible.
Consider the following two allocations: In allocation
a, runners 1 through m/3 are assigned to the first
heat, runners (m/3) + 1 through 2m/3 to the sec-
ond heat and runners (2m/3) + 1 through m to the
third heat. In allocation a′, on the other hand, the
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first heat is comprised of runners 1,4,7, . . . ,m− 2;
the second of runners 2,5,8, . . . ,m−1, and the third
of the remaining runners. Allocation a′ results in a
more balanced distribution of baseline speed across
heats.
Are runners, on average, likely to run faster un-
der one of these two allocations? This is a question
about the overall causal effect E[Y (a)]−E[Y (a′)]. If
the number of groups is the same under both alloca-
tions, as in our example, then the direct and indirect
effects of allocations a and a′ may also be of inter-
est (see Section 2.1). The expected unit-level effect
UE1(a; 3,1) ≡ E[Y1(a−1,3)] − E[Y1(a−1,1)] is the
expected effect on runner 1 of racing in the fastest
versus the slowest heat in allocation a. The ex-
pected spillover effect SE 1(a,a
′; 1)≡E[Y1(a−1,1)]−
E[Y1(a
′
−1,1)] is the expected effect on runner 1 of
running in the first heat when that heat is comprised
of the fastest runners versus running in the first heat
when that heat is comprised of runners with a mix
of speeds. (In both cases, the expectations are with
respect to multiple independent races.) This might
matter if running in the first heat was advantageous
because the crowd was more enthusiastic earlier on,
a point to which we return below.
As always, in order to identify expectations of
counterfactuals of the form Yki(ak) we require con-
ditional exchangeability for the effect of Ak on Yki.
If Ak and Zki share any common causes, as they
would if, for example, heats were assigned based on
the identity of the runners’ coaches, then those com-
mon causes must be included in the conditioning set.
If Aki depends on any component of Zki then that
component must be included in the conditioning set
in order to achieve exchangeability. Similarly, if Aki
depends on a component of Zk, that is, there are
arrows from Zki and from Zkj , j 6= i, into Aki, then
that component of Zk must be included in the con-
ditioning set. We note that conditioning on a com-
ponent of Zk may block part of the effect of Ak on
Yki; because Z
∗
ki is a deterministic function of Zk
conditioning on the latter is effectively conditioning
on the former. Z∗ki lies on the causal pathway from
Ak to Yki and, therefore, conditioning on it blocks
part of the causal effect of interest.
Let Tkli be a group-level property of group li in
block k, where li indexes the group to which in-
dividual i is assigned, and define Tki ≡ Tkli to be
the group-level property to which individual i is ex-
posed. If the order in which the heats are run makes
a difference, because the weather changes through-
out the day or because runners are tired later in
the day, then Tki could be the time at which sub-
ject i’s heat is scheduled to race. This is an exam-
ple of a preallocation group-level covariate that al-
lows the groups to be distinguished from one an-
other without reference to their composition. Other
examples of this kind of group-level property are the
teacher in charge of each classroom, the curricula to
which classrooms are assigned, or different locations
in which heats are assigned to run.
For the purposes of our race example, let Tki be
a measure of the crowd enthusiasm when runner i
runs. The arrows from Ai into Ti on the DAG in Fig-
ure 15 are necessitated by the way we have defined
Tki, namely as a collection of properties of the group
to which individual i is assigned. Properties that de-
pend on group composition but are not captured by
Z∗ki, such as the number of runners in the heat, can
also affect Yki. Unlike the time at which each heat
runs, these properties arise after group allocation
and, therefore, do not distinguish the groups from
one another a priori. If Tki is itself affected by group
composition, because the size of the crowd is deter-
mined by who is in each heat, then we would also
require arrows Aj → Ti; these are the dashed arrows
in Figure 15. Suppose that crowd enthusiasm is de-
termined by the proportion of runners in the heat
who are in the fastest quartile of all of the runners in
the race, based on the baseline composite measure.
Then Tki is affected by Zk (which includes a mea-
sure of each runner’s previous performance), and we
require arrows from each Zj into Ti, as on the DAG
in Figure 16. If data on Tk is not collected, or if
it is not known whether any group-level properties
Fig. 15.
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affect Yki, then we would add arrows from each Ai
into each Yj on the DAG in Figure 15, to represent
the residual effect of Ak on Ykj due to unobserved
group properties.
We also may be interested in whether the effect
of an allocation is mediated by group attributes Tk.
In order to identify mediated effects through Tk it
must be hypothetically possible to intervene on Tk
without manipulating any other variable that may
cause Yki not through Tk. For example, if Tki is
the enthusiasm of the crowd when i’s group runs
the race, then we can imagine intervening on Tk
by changing the composition of the crowd without
changing the assignments of runners to heats or their
covariates. On the other hand, if Tki is the number
of runners in i’s group, then clearly any intervention
on Tk must operate because of Ak, which causes Yki
not through Tk. Natural direct, natural indirect and
controlled direct effects are not coherently defined in
this case. This is because counterfactuals of the form
Yki(ak,Tk(a
′
k)) are not well-defined if we cannot hy-
pothetically simultaneously intervene onAk, setting
it to ak, and on Tk, setting it to its counterfactual
value under allocation a′k. If the only way to set
Tk to its counterfactual value under allocation a
′
k is
through an intervention that setsAk to a
′
k, then this
hypothetical joint intervention is not possible. The
effects of Ak on Yki with Z
∗
ki as a mediator are simi-
larly incoherent, because it is impossible to imagine
intervening on Z∗ki without manipulating Ak, Zk, or
both. If we are interested in the role that Z∗ki plays
in the effect of group allocation on the outcome, we
can instead estimate the effects of Z∗ki on Yki.
5. A NOTE ON INTERFERENCE AND SOCIAL
NETWORKS
Our discussion thus far has focused on settings in
which individuals are clustered into blocks and in
which individuals in distinct blocks do not influence
each other. In some contexts, it may be the case that
there are no or few distinct independent blocks; so-
cial networks constitute one such setting. A social
network is a collection of individuals and the so-
cial ties between them, for example ties of friend-
ship, kinship or physical proximity. Social networks
are of public health interest because certain health-
related behaviors, beliefs and outcomes may prop-
agate socially (Christakis and Fowler, 2007, 2008;
Smith and Christakis, 2008), but of course they are
rife with interference, making causal inference diffi-
cult.
Allocational interference essentially involves inter-
vening on the network structure itself, creating new
ties by assigning individuals to the same group, for
example, assigning children to the same classroom,
and possibly breaking old ties by assigning individ-
uals to different groups. An intervention on class-
room assignments within a school could be seen as
creating a new network topology at the beginning
of every school year. Because the network itself is
manipulated in allocational interference, it may be
a useful lens through which to understand interven-
tions on ties in social network contexts.
Contagion and direct interference occur natu-
rally and widely in social networks. Direct in-
terference may be present whenever an exposure
consists of ideas, beliefs, knowledge or physical
goods which can be shared by an exposed in-
dividual with his associates. Contagion in social
networks has been written about extensively in
recent years (Christakis and Fowler, 2007, 2008;
Mulvaney-Day and Womack, 2009; Smith and Chris-
takis, 2008). Infectious diseases are more likely to
spread between people closely connected in a social
network (e.g., because they live together or spend
time together), and in addition there is some re-
cent evidence that traits and behaviors like obe-
sity and smoking may be “socially contagious”
(Christakis and Fowler, 2007, 2008). The precise
mechanisms for these purported phenomena are un-
known, but some researchers have hypothesized that
latent outcomes related to the observed outcomes
may be transmitted through social contact. For ex-
ample, Christakis and Fowler (2007, 2008) have sug-
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gested that beliefs about the acceptability of differ-
ent smoking behaviors and body types may be con-
tagious. If this is in fact the mechanism underlying
what appears to be contagion of smoking behavior
or obesity, then the true structure is depicted by
the DAG in Figure 17. Oti represents the observed
characteristic of subject i at time t, for example
his smoking behavior, and Bti represents his beliefs,
for example, about the acceptability of smoking.
We observe a phenomenon that resembles conta-
gion, namely that Oti appears to have a causal effect
on Ot+1j . However, this apparent effect may not be
due to a causal pathway but rather to the back-
door path Oti ←B
t−1
i →B
t
j →O
t+1
j as in Figure 17.
Another possible structure that would give rise to
apparent contagion is presented in Figure 18. Here,
O is indeed contagious, but the path by which con-
tagion operates is mediated by B. Distinguishing
between these different structures could have impli-
cations for interventions and policies. If the DAG in
Figure 17 represents the true causal structure, then
intervening on O or introducing a policy targeted at
affecting O will not disrupt the contagious process;
we should attempt to intervene on underlying beliefs
instead. If the DAG in Figure 18 captures the true
mechanisms at work, then intervening on either O
or B can disrupt the contagious process.
Fig. 18.
The discussion of contagion and direct interfer-
ence in Section 4 may be useful for clarifying as-
pects of social network research. In many types of
social networks and for many types of exposures
and outcomes, both contagion and direct interfer-
ence will be present. The results in Section 4.2.1
can sometimes be used to differentiate between the
two types of interference. Contagion cannot be iden-
tified by cross-sectional network data without very
strong assumptions about temporal and causal re-
lationships, and some effects related to contagion
require fine-grained information on outcomes in the
network over time. Conversely, social network data
can be used to refine assumptions about the struc-
ture of interference. We have assumed that inter-
ference occurred between all individuals in a block.
This corresponds to a network in which each individ-
ual has a tie to every other individual in the same
block. But if anything is known about the actual
network topology, specifically about the absence of
ties between certain individuals, then this informa-
tion could be used to refine the causal structure of
interference represented on the DAGs given in Sec-
tion 3 and, therefore, the conditions under which
causal effects are identifiable.
6. CONCLUSION
It is of paramount importance to carefully con-
sider the specific causal structure whenever interfer-
ence may operate on the relation between one indi-
vidual’s treatment and another’s outcome. The pos-
sible structures are numerous and valid causal infer-
ence may require different assumptions in each one,
depending on the effect of interest and the nature of
confounding.
Also of great importance is the definition of the
variables involved in the causal pathways under in-
vestigation. In some cases, the difference between
interference by contagion and direct interference is
contextual: depending on how we define the treat-
ment and the outcome, some causal relationships
can be seen as either one. Recall the example of di-
rect interference that we presented in Section 4.1:
the outcome is weight change and the treatment di-
etary counseling from a nutritionist. Direct inter-
ference occurs when a treated individual “treats”
his associates by imparting to them the informa-
tion gained from the nutritionist, thereby directly
affecting their obesity status. Underlying this di-
rect interference is a contagious process by which
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the treated individual transmits his understanding
of how to adopt and maintain a healthy diet to his
associates; “catching” this understanding causes the
associates to lose weight. Defining variables precisely
and narrowly is always a difficulty for causal in-
ference; the challenge is to conduct valid inference
when we do not observe the underlying causal mech-
anisms but instead have to base our analyses on
constructs like weight, symptomatic flu, scholastic
achievement, visits with a nutritionist, etc.
This paper scratches the surface of the enor-
mous challenge of causal inference in the pres-
ence of interference. We have not, for example,
touched upon estimation of causal effects or on
inference, areas where some progress has been
made in recent years (Aronow and Samii, 2013;
Bowers, Fredrickson and Panagopoulos, 2013; Gra-
ham, Imbens and Ridder, 2010; Hudgens and Hal-
loran, 2008; Manski, 2013; Rosenbaum, 2007; Tch-
etgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012) but much
more is needed.
APPENDIX
We describe the identification of the effects of Ai
on Yj for the DAGs in Figure 5 when C is not fully
observed.
In Figure 5(c), standardizing by Ci identifies the
effect of Ai on Yj :
∑
ci
E[Yj|Ai = ai,Ci = ci]P (Ci = c)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yj |Ai = ai,
Ci = ci,Aj = aj ,Cj = cj]
· P (Aj = aj,
Cj = cj |Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yj(ai, aj)|Ai = ai,
Ci = ci,Aj = aj ,Cj = cj]
· P (Aj = aj,
Cj = cj |Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yj(ai, aj)|Ci = ci,Cj = cj ]
· P (Aj = aj,
Cj = cj |Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci).
This is a weighted average of C-specific counterfac-
tuals Yj(a). [Replacing Ci with D in the expressions
above gives the identifying expression for the effect
of Ai on Yj in Figure 5(e).] Standardizing by Ci
also identifies the effect of Ai on Yi for the DAGs
in Figures 5(a) and 5(c), similarly giving a weighted
average of C-specific counterfactuals:
∑
ci
E[Yi|Ai = ai,Ci = ci]P (Ci = c)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yi|Ai = ai,
Ci = ci,Aj = aj,Cj = cj ]
· P (Aj = aj ,
Cj = cj|Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yi(ai, aj)|Ai = ai,
Ci = ci,Aj = aj,Cj = cj ]
· P (Aj = aj ,
Cj = cj|Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci)
=
∑
aj
∑
cj
∑
ci
E[Yi(ai, aj)|Ci = ci,Cj = cj ]
· P (Aj = aj ,
Cj = cj|Ai = ai,Ci = ci)
· P (Ci = ci).
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